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CHAPTER 10 
Security, Mortgages, and Other 
Creditor's Rights 
ALEXANDER NEKAM and JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR. 
It is said that the nexus of contract law holds together the business 
world. Certainly credit transactions form a great part of that web of 
contracts. A portion of the law in regard to the rights of creditors is 
treated in this chapter. It is treated as an interrelated subject, though 
the title of the chapter is taken from the usual law school courses and 
the legal research index headings under which the topics discussed 
would appear. 
Of course, from time to time during any survey year this subject 
matter may be broken into one or more additional subjects depend-
ing on the significance and the volume of developments. It suffices to 
say that a combined treatment seemed warranted in the 1954 SURVEY. 
§lO.l. Subrogation on public contracts. An important issue with 
respect to a surety's right of subrogation under a statutory payment 
bond was resolved during the survey year in Duteau v. Salvucci. 1 
The Department of Public Works entered into a contract for the 
construction of a highway. The contract provided that a percentage 
of the amounts earned by the contractor as the work progressed might 
be retained by the Commonwealth, and the contractor also furnished 
a surety company bond for the payment of laborers and materialmen. 
Under the terms of the contract, the Commonwealth retained over 
$99,000. A number of laborers and materialmen, having given statu-
tory2 notice of nonpayment, brought suit against the contractor, the 
surety company, and the Commonwealth. Part of the claims were 
settled and paid by the surety company to the extent of some $145,000. 
Two claims of one claimant were litigated, and one of them was al-
lowed to the extent of some $6000. The Commonwealth was ordered 
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§lO.l CREDITOR'S RIGHTS 83 
to pay this amount to the claimant, and then to pay the balance of the 
retained percentage of the contract price to the surety company. 
The Division of Employment Security in the Department of Labor 
and Industries filed an intervening petition in which it claimed as 
an offset against the retained percentages in the hands of the Depart-
ment of Public Works some $1800 which the contractor owed in pay-
roll taxes under the Unemployment Insurance Act. This petition was 
dismissed. 
The intervening petition was based upon the twofold theory that 
(1) the retained percentages were assets of the contractor against which 
there existed a lien for payroll taxes which had priority over the right 
of the surety to participate in them, and (2) the surety, in any event, had 
no right to be reimbursed out of assets of the principal debtor (the 
contractor) while beneficiaries of the bond (the Commonwealth was 
obligee in the bond) were unpaid. 
The second contention was rejected because, as the Court pointed 
out, the contractor's obligation to pay payroll taxes was not guaran-
teed by the bond, so that the surety was not, in fact, competing with a 
beneficiary of the statutory bond. In any event, the Court contin-
ued, the surety was entitled to the retained percentages, not by way of 
direct reimbursement from the assets of the principal debtor, the 
contractor, but by way of subrogation to the rights of the laborers 
and materialmen whom it had paid. The retained percentages consti-
tuted a fund primarily for the payment of these persons, and the 
surety, upon paying them, was entitled to step into their shoes. 
The first contention of the Commonwealth posed a more difficult 
problem. The statute3 provides that payroll taxes "shall have priority 
over all other claims against an employer, except wage claims." The 
record did not indicate which, if any, of the claims paid by the surety 
under its bond were for wages. 
The Court met this problem by discerning a degree of inconsistency 
between the letter of this statute and that regarding payment bonds. 
The first statute is designed to aid those out of work, while the sec-
ond is designed to secure payment for those who furnish labor or ma-
terials to contractors. Thus viewed, said the Court, the statutes "are 
concerned with different means of increasing the public welfare .... 
Each must be confined to its own particular field and construed har-
moniously with the other." 4 
The Court then proceeded to resolve the perceived conflict by rul-
ing that the retained percentages were not, after all, assets of the con-
tractor, since he had no right (under his contract) to collect any part 
of that fund until the claims of laborers and materialmen were paid. 
It follows from this, concluded the Court, that the retained percent-
• C.L., c. ISlA, §17. See also Section 16, which provides that the tax shall be a 
lien against the assets of the employer, "subordinate, however, to claims for unpaid 
wages." 
• 330 Mass. 531, 537, lIS N.E.2d 726, 730 (1953). 
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ages constitute a fund to which unpaid laborers and materialmen 
may look before it is used for payments to others. 
In thus grounding its decision, the Court seems to identify the ma-
terialman's right in the collateral security as a right separate and dis-
tinct from (although not unrelated to) his right to enforce his claim 
against the principal debtor, the contractor. This theory of legal re-
lations is similar to that introduced into the law by the Louisiana 
statute5 which provides for direct action by the victim of a tort-feasor 
against the latter's liability insurer without first prevailing in an action 
against the tort-feasor. This appears to be the substantive effect of the 
instant decision, although it is still the procedural law of the Common-
wealth that, in order to enforce his right in the collateral security, the 
materialman must join the contractor as an indispensable party.6 
§lO.2. The Statute of Frauds. The suretyship section of the Statute 
of Frauds! was unsuccessfully invoked in Duca v. Lord.2 
John Deferrari, a benefactor of the Boston Public Library, had given 
the library trustees a building which was in need of repairs. After 
some preliminary negotiations between Deferrari and Duca, the lat-
t<'.T entered into a repair contract with the library trustees at a price 
of $9500. The work was done under the direction of Deferrari, and 
was "checked" by a member of the library staff. In addition to per-
forming the contract fully, Duca did extra work in connection with 
the repairs to the value of some $10,000. He asked Deferrari for pay-
ment for the extra work, and was told, "If the library doesn't pay you, 
I will pay you." 
After Deferrari's death, Duca brought suit against his executor for 
the value of the extra work. The defendant pleaded the Statute of 
Frauds. It was found that both Duca and Deferrari had expected the 
trustees of the library to pay for the extra work, and that if they 
failed to pay, Deferrari would do so. The trustees refused to enter 
into a contract for the extra work, and refused to pay for it. 
The Court, affirming the judgment of the Superior Court, ruled that 
the oral promise of Deferrari did not come within the Statute of 
Frauds. The statute, the Court pointed out, is applicable only when 
there is an obligation of a third person which is guaranteed by a de-
fendant's oral promise. Here, where there was no obligation of the li-
brary trustees to which Deferrari's promise could have been collateral, 
his promise was not one "to answer for the debt, default or misdoings 
of another." 
"La. Rev. Stat. tit. 22, §655 (1950). 
• The Duteau case and Lock Joint Pipe Co. v. Commonwealth, 1954 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 375, 118 N.E.2d 869, are of interest also because they interpret and apply the 
provision of General Laws, Chapter 30, Section 39, that in order to exercise rights in 
the security required by that section, laborers and materialmen must file statements 
of their claims within sixty days after the claimant ceases to perform labor or furnish 
materials. 
§IO.2. 1 G.L., c. 259, §l. 
'1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 53, 117 N.E.2d 145. 
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The principle is an easy one to state, but its application is fre-
quently difficult. In fact, in the instant case, the Court found it neces-
sary to overrule a statement in an earlier case.3 There the "principal 
undertaking" was void for want of consideration, yet the Court said 
that a promise guaranteeing its performance was unenforceable by 
reason of the Statute of Frauds. In the Duca case, the Court con-
ceded that this was an incorrect statement of the law, but pointed out 
that the statement was not necessary to the decision, as the promise of 
guaranty was held unenforceable for other reasons. 
The difficulty of application of the basic principle involved in the 
Duca case is usually a factual difficulty. Thus, when A introduces B 
to C, and says to C, "Give B the goods he wants, and I will see you are 
paid," or similar words, there may be anyone of several sets of legal 
relations created. A may be making a gift to B, in which case his 
promise, though oral, would be enforceable.4 Again, A may be prom-l ising to underwrite B's express or implied undertaking to pay for the 
goods, in which case his promise, because it is oral, would be unen-
forceable. Yet again, A may make himself a joint promisor with B 
for payment of the purchase price, in which case his obligation, being 
independent of any default on B's part, would be enforceable. In the 
lJuca case these factual difficulties were not present, since it was undis-
puted that Duca had made no contract with the library for the extra 
work, and at best both he and Deferrari merely hoped that the li-
I 
brary would enter into such a contract. 
§lO.3. The case of the dormant mortgage. The case of Marshall v. 
Francis! came up on an extraordinary set of facts, and reached an even 
more extraordinary result. 
I 
In 1863 a mortgage was given and recorded to secure the purchase 
price of a parcel of land. After maturity of the debt the mortgage was 
assigned, and it appeared of record that the indebtedness had, by then, 
been reduced from $350 to $50. After the assignment, in 1868, there 
were several conveyances of the land, in none of which was there any 
reference made to the 1863 mortgage. In 1883 one Roderick, a suc-
cessor in title of the mortgagor, gave a mortgage, which was foreclosed, 
and the title of the foreclosing mortgagee ultimately devolved upon 
Marshall, who brought a petition to register title to the land. The 
interest of the assignee of the 1863 mortgage (if there was any such in-
terest) came to the respondent, Francis, under a residuary clause in 




The Court noted that the record failed to show that any of the suc-
cessive owners in the chain of title up to 1901 had occupied the prop-
erty, and it ruled that, although a 1901 grantee entered into posses-
sion, there was a break in the continuity of that possession in 1919, 
when the then owner moved to another state. This led to the con-
3 Crowley v. Whittemore, 255 Mass. 99, 130, 150 N.E. 880, 882 (1926). 
• Arant, Suretyship 90 et seq. (1931); Simpson, Suretyship 122 et seq. (1950); d. 
Simpson v. Penton, 2 Cromp. & M. 430 (1834). 
~10.3. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 663, 120 N.E.2d 761. 
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clusion that there had been neither acquisition of title against the 
1863 mortgage by adverse possession, nor a presumption of payment 
which would have grown out of occupation for twenty years after ac-
crual of the right to foreclose, with nonrecognition of the mortgage. 
The Court ordered that title be registered in the name of the peti-
tioner, subject to the 1863 mortgage. 
The soundness of the decision has been questioned.2 But, sound 
or not, it establishes the law of the Commonwealth, and is not likely 
to be overruled. It points out in a striking way, furthermore, a seri-
ous defect in the recording statutes. That a mortgage, simply because 
it was recorded and has not been discharged of record, can remain 
dormant, unrecognized, and unenforced for nearly a century and 
then can be recognized as an encumbrance on the fee, poses a real 
threat to the security and stability of titles. It is common knowledge 
that frequently a mortgagee, after receiving satisfaction, fails to give a \ .. 
discharge. More frequently, the mortgagor, after paying in full and 
receiving a discharge, fails, through ignorance or inadvertence, to 
place the discharge on record. The situation is one which calls for 
remedial legislation. 
§10A. Spendthrift trusts: Rights of creditors of the beneficiary. 
In general the interest of a beneficiary of a trust is subject to alienation 
by him and may be taken to satisfy the claims of his creditors. The 
settlor, on the other hand, may expressly provide that the benefici-
ary's interest shall be inalienable and that his creditors may not reach 
it in satisfaction of their claims; such a restraint on alienation wll gen-
erally be held to be valid. The decisions, however, are qute uniform 
everywhere in holding that where settlor and beneficiary are the same 
person, no restraint on alienation can be imposed: no one may create 
a trust for his own benefit so as to put the estate outside the reach of 
his credi tors. 
That this is the established policy of Massachusetts has recently been 
reaffirmed in Merchants National Bank v. Morissey.l To the uniform 
application of this policy there seemed, however, to have remained 
an exception. In Crawford v. Langmaid2 the settlor created an estate 
for life in herself, reserved to herself a general power to appoint the 
remainder by her will, and in default made a gift to those who would 
take in the event that there was no will. In addition she gave the 
trustees power to sell, in their discretion, the trust property for her 
benefit. It was held that in this situation the creditors of the settlor 
could reach the principal of the fund. The debtor, the Court rea-
soned, never obtained a vested interest in the principal; the contin-
gency provided for (the exercise of the trustees' discretion) might 
never happen at all. 
To the extent of its holding that the discretion confided in the trus-
• Stein, Conveyancers Beware, 25 Boston Bar Bull. 295 (1954). 
§1O.4. 1329 Mass. 601, 109 N.E.2d 606 (1953). 
2171 Mass. 309,50 N.E. 606 (1898). 
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tees precludes creditors from reaching the principal, the Crawford 
case has now expressly been overruled in Ware v. Gulda.3 Here 
the defendant, the settlor of the trust, was to be its only beneficiary 
during her lifetime. It was left entirely in the discretion of the trus-
tee whether to make any payments to her, either from the principal 
or from the income, and she was made incapable of assigning any of 
her interest under the trust. The Supreme Judicial Court held that al-
J though the trustee did not exercise the discretionary power conferred 
upon him by the settlor, this was no ground to distinguish the case in 
principle from the general rule as restated in the Merchants Bank 
case, supra, and that the creditor therefore could reach the maximum 
amount which the trustee under the terms of the trust could pay to 
the beneficiary or apply for her benefit. The Court asserted that al-
though this may result in taking property away from the remainder-
men, the objection has no force here, as the trustee had power to pay 
the entire principal to the beneficiary. 
/ 
I 
The creditor was the defendant's attorney in a previous suit in 
which she unsuccessfully tried to establish that her ratification of the 
trust instrument was procured by fraud. The Court found nothing 
incongruous in the settlor-beneficiary not succeeding in upsetting the 
trust and in her counsel being paid out of trust property. In her 
suit she had tried to prove fraud and failed. Her creditor, on the 
other hand, prevailed, not because the settlement was fraudulent, but 
because it is the policy of Massachusetts law not to protect the set-
tlor-beneficiary of a discretionary trust against the claim of his credi-
tors, in circumstances such as were involved in this case. 
§IO.5. Equitable liquidation: Priority of federal government claims. 
Where, in proceedings arising out of a bill for a receiverhip brought 
by a judgment creditor against a debtor corporation, the balance of 
the receivership assets is insufficient to pay both a claim of the United 
States for taxes and a claim of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, is 
the claim of the United States entitled to priority? 
Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes,l which provides for priority for 
debts due to the United States, has always been interpreted as not es-
tablishing such priority merely because the debtor is insolvent, but 
only when this insolvency is shown in anyone of the three situations 
stated in that section: (1) where a debtor, not having sufficient prop-
erty to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof; (2) 
where the effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are at-
tached by process of law; or (3) where an act of bankruptcy has been 
commi tted. 2 
In W. A. Robinson, Inc. v. Trawler Leretha, Inc.,3 on the basis of 
"1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 73, 117 N.E.2d 137. 
§1O.5. '31 U.S.C. §191 (1946). 
, Bramwell v. U.S. Fidelity Co., 269 U.S. 483, 46 Sup. Ct. 176,70 L. Ed. 368 (1926): 
United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423, 62 Sup. Ct. 317, 86 L. Ed. 315 (1941); United 
States v. Commissioner of Banks, 254 Mass. 173, 149 N.E. 883 (1925). 
31954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 545, 120 N.E.2d 385. 
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such an interpretation, the Commonwealth appealed from a decree of 
the Superior Court authorizing the receiver to pay the balance of 
the receivership assets to the United States. The Commonwealth ar-
gued that although the debtor was insolvent, Section 3466 did not ap-
ply because no act of bankruptcy was committed. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, however, affirmed the decree. While 
prior to the Chandler Act there might have been some doubt as to 
whether the appointment of a receiver to take charge of the debtor's " 
property did constitute an act of bankruptcy, since the changes intro-
duced by that legislation it is clear that such proceedings do constitute 
such an act. The condition required by Section 3466 is therefore satis-
fied. 
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